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NOTES
CIVIL INCEST SUITS: GETTING BEYOND THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Women are slowly breaking the silence that surrounds incest.' As
they begin to realize the harmful effects of incestuous abuse,2 adult survi-
vors3 demand compensation from the men who abused them.4 Relying
upon traditional tort theories, many women file civil lawsuits against
their fathers,5 seeking damages for physical and emotional abuse.6 Stat-
1. For purposes of this Note "incest" is defined as any sexually motivated physical contact
between a child and an adult of paternal authority. This is the definition used by Judith Herman,
noted scholar on father-daughter incest. See J. HERMAN, FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST 70 (1981).
This Note adopts a broad definition of incest, comprehending any sexually motivated physical con-
tact, in order to protect children from harmful contact by adults seeking sexual gratification.
The scope of this Note is limited to father-daughter incest because it is the most reported type of
incest. See id. at 19 (94.1% of reported eases involve father-daughter incest).
2. Women have written and published stories about their personal experiences in an effort to
break the silence surrounding incest. Although speaking out about incest is very painful, victims of
incest also find it a very empowering experience. See generally VOICES IN THE NIGHT--WOMEN
SPEAKING ABOUT INCEST (r. McNARON & Y. MORGAN eds. 1982). For a bibliography of books
containing stories of women's experiences as incest victims, see E. BASS & L. DAVIS, THE COURAGE
To HEAL-A GUIDE FOR WOMEN SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 467-69 (1988).
3. Women incestuously abused as children describe themselves as survivors, not victims. The
description is important because it emphasizes the strength, rather than any weakness, of these wo-
men and thus is empowering. See E. BASS & L. DAVIS, supra note 2, at 13-15. This Note describes
daughters incestuously abused by their fathers as both "incest victims" and "adult survivors" be-
cause it is important to remember both the extreme victimization and the powerful survival skills
that characterize these women.
4. See Mithers, Incest and the Law, N.Y. TIMES MAG. 44 (Oct. 21, 1990). For a discussion of
an early California case denying compensation to an adult survivor of incest, see Note, Statutes of
Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.L 189, 204-
06 (1984).
5. Organizations such as the National Organization for Women's Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund are providing technical assistance to women and their attorneys. For mailings write:
NOW Legal Defense Fund, 99 Hudson Street, New York, NY 10013.
6. Courts refuse to recognize a separate tort for child abuse. See, eg., St. Michelle v. Robin-
son, 52 Wash. App. 309, 759 P.2d 467, 471 (1988) (noting view that a specific tort of child abuse is
unnecessary as traditional tort doctrines are adequate). As a result, plaintiffs in civil incest suits
must base their claims on traditional torts, including assault, battery, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty. See, eg., Doe v. Doe, 216 Cal. App. 3d 285, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1989), review granted, 268 Cal. Rptr 283, 788 P.2d 1155 (1990). The problem, of course,
is that the statutes of limitation governing these torts often bar the plaintiff's claim in civil incest
cases. See infra notes 116, 123, 135 and accompanying text.
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utes of limitation, however, pose a major obstacle to such women.7
Lawsuits seeking damages for incest are often not filed until several
years after the abuse ceases.8 Victims of incest develop defense mecha-
nisms to protect themselves from the emotional trauma of sexual abuse. 9
These defense mechanisms may preclude an incest victim from under-
standing the nature of her injuries. 10 Without this understanding, the
victim is unlikely to file suit against her abuser.
Because of the delay in filing a lawsuit, the governing state statute of
limitations presents an obstacle to prosecution. Most states typically re-
quire suits to be filed within one to three years. Some courts hold that
this period begins to run from the date of the last abusive act, thus bar-
ring suits filed several years after the incest ends." Other courts, how-
ever, hold that the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff
discovers the harm caused by the abuse. 12
This Note argues that women lack an adequate remedy for harm
caused by the incestuous acts of their fathers. Part I will discuss the
7. The doctrine of parental immunity is another obstacle confronting civil incest plaintiffs.
See, eg., Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (policy of preserving harmony in domestic
relations precludes minor child from suing her father for damages resulting from his raping her).
However, many courts have either abolished the doctrine or limited it to very narrow situations. See
Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980) (adopting a reasonable parent standard); Goller
v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963) (abrogating parental immunity except where the
allegedly tortious act involves an exercise of parental authority or ordinary parental discretion with
respect to the necessities of life).
8. For example, the plaintiff in DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr.
368, 369-70 (1987), filed suit thirteen years after the last incestuous act occurred. She claimed that
although aware of the sexual abuse, she was not aware of how the abuse affected her life. Id. at 370.
The plaintiff in Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1364 (N.D. Ill. 1988), filed suit twenty years
after her father stopped abusing her. She claimed she had repressed all memories of the abuse until
she began psychotherapy. Id.
9. See infra note 61 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various defense mechanisms
used by sexually abused women.
10. An incest survivor may not understand the effects of the abuse on her emotionally, physi-
cally and sexually. See infra notes 41-59 and accompanying text.
11. The traditional rule is that statutes of limitation begin to run from the date of the allegedly
tortious act. See, eg., Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957) (medical instrument left
in patient's abdomen).
12. In order to avoid harsh results in some cases, courts created the discovery rule as an excep-
tion to the traditional rule that the limitations period begins to run from the date of the allegedly
tortious act. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1948); Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 115-17 (1982). The discovery rule holds that the statute begins to run when the
plaintiff discovers all the elements of his cause of action. Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 75, 727
P.2d 226, 227 (1986). For a discussion of the application of the discovery rule in different types of
cases, see infra notes 83-110 and accompanying text.
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prevalence and seriousness of the incest problem, and outline the societal
response, the family dynamics, and the individual defense mechanisms
that make it difficult for an incest victim to file suit within the statutory
time period for intentional tort actions. Part II will focus on the discov-
ery rule and its application to various cases. Part III will discuss judicial
application of the discovery rule to two types of civil incest cases, those
involving women with repressed memories of the abuse and those involv-
ing women who remember the abuse. Part IV explores the legislative
response to the statute of limitations problem in civil incest suits. Fi-
nally, this Note concludes that because courts are reluctant to apply the
discovery rule in some cases, particularly those in which the plaintiff re-
members the abuse, legislation is required to give incest victims a mean-
ingful opportunity to file civil suits against their abusers.
I. FATHER-DAUGHTER INCEST
A. Society's Response
Father-daughter incest is a widespread and serious problem in our so-
ciety.13 Estimates of the frequency of father-daughter incest range from
one in every one hundred women 4 to five in every one hundred
13. Judith Herman reviewed the five largest studies of parent-child incest and found that 94.1%
of the 506 reported cases involved father-daughter incest, 2.6% involved father-son incest, 2.8%
involved mother-son incest, and 0.5% involved mother-daughter incest. J. HERMAN, supra note 1,
at 19. Some researchers explain the high incidence of father-daughter incest in terms of reporting,
not in terms of actual occurrence. Dixon, Arnold, and Calestro, Father-Son Incest: Underreported
Psychiatric Problem?, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 835, 835-38 (1978). Herman disagrees, arguing that
the preponderance of father-daughter incest is not due to differential reporting, but reflects actual
occurrence. She believes that the overwhelming occurrence of father-daughter incest is a product of
a patriarchal society, in which labor is sharply divided according to gender. J. HERMAN, supra note
1, at 53-63.
Although victimized less often than female children, male children are nonetheless vulnerable to
sexual exploitation by adult family members and suffer substantial harm from incestuous abuse. See
Nasjleti, Suffering in Silence: The Male Incest Victim, in OUT OF HARM'S WAY: READINGS ON
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, ITS PREvEIlON AND TREATMENT 66 (Haden ed. 1986).
Incest also occurs between siblings. Once dismissed as harmless sexual exploration, mental health
professionals now recognize the potential harm of sibling incest under certain circumstances, empha-
sizing such factors as (1) the age difference between siblings, (2) the use of force, threats, or author-
ity, and (3) attempted or completed penetration and documented physical injury. DeJong, Sexual
Interactions Among Siblings and Cousins-Experimentation or Exploitation?, 13 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 271, 276 (1989).
14. This figure is based on five surveys: C. Landis' study of 295 women in 1940; Kinsey's study
of 4,441 women in 1953; J. Landis' study of 1028 college students in 1956; Gagnon's study of 1200
women in 1965; and Finkelhor's study of 530 women in 1978. See J. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 12-
13.
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women. 15
Historically, society has been unaware of the frequency and severity of
incest. 6 Following the lead of Sigmund Freud, society viewed incest
claims with skepticism for much of the twentieth century. 17 The legal
profession shared this skepticism."8 Society's awareness of the incest
problem began to increase during the 1970's, largely due to the women's
movement. 9 Feminists forced society to recognize the widespread sex-
ual victimization of women, in the form of pornography, rape, and in-
cest.2" Today, incestuous behavior is a felony in every state and states
are endeavoring to improve the prosecution of child sexual abuse cases.21
15. D. RUSSELL, THE SECRET TRAUMA-INCEST IN THE LIVES OF GIRLS AND WOMEN 216
(1986). Diana Russell surveyed a random sample of 930 women in San Francisco in 1978 and found
that 4.5% of the women had been incestuously abused before the age of eighteen by a biological
father, a stepfather, a foster-care father, or an adoptive father. Id.
Researchers are unable to obtain exact figures because of variations in defining incest, the lack of a
uniform methodology, and underreporting. R. GOLDMAN & V. WHEELER, SILENT SHAME: THE
SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN 21-22 (1986). Researchers disagree as to the individuals who may
commit incest and the types of behavior constituting incest. Also, the lack of control groups, the use
of case histories, concentration on the victims, and individual biases and prejudices can skew results
in incest-related research. Id.
16. D. RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 3-9.
17. J. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 11. Early in his career, Sigmund Freud advanced what was
later called the "seduction theory": the theory that the origin of neurosis lies in childhood sexual
victimization. See generally, Westerlund, Freud on Sexual Trauma: A Historical Review of Seduction
and Betrayal, 10 PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN Q. 297 (1986). Freud later retracted this theory, stating
that his patients had been lying to themselves and to him. J. MASSON, THE ASSAULT ON TRUTH:
FREUD'S SUPPRESSION OF THE SEDUCTION THEORY 11-12 (1984). Masson, after examining the
published and unpublished works of Freud, came to this conclusion: "I adduce a large number of
new facts that were unknown before, or simply unnoticed, to support my opinion that Freud gave up
this theory, not for theoretical or clinical reasons, but because of a personal failure of courage." J.
MASSON, supra at 189.
18. John Henry Wigmore warned that courts should view sexual assault charges made by
young girls with skepticism. J. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1934), cited in J. HERMAN,
supra note 1, at 11. He recommended that a psychiatrist examine female children who accuse their
fathers of incestuous abuse to determine their credibility. Id. Wigmore, like Freud, apparently be-
lieved that the incestuous relationship existed only in the child's mind. See supra note 17. For a
further discussion of societal denial of the prevalence and severity of child sexual abuse, see Summit,
Hidden Victims, Hidden Pain, in LASTING EFFECTS OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 39 (Wyatt & Powell
eds. 1988).
19. J. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 18. See also Wattenberg, In a Different Light: A Feminist
Perspective on the Role of Mothers in Father-Daughter Incest, 64 CHILD WELFARE 203 (1985).
20. D. RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 5. Feminist authors helped change the way society views the
sexual victimization of women. For example, though once viewed as a crime of lust, rape is now
regarded as a crime of violence and power. S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, Wo-
MEN, AND RAPE (1975).
21. For a listing of statutes criminalizing the sexual abuse of children, see Comment, Statute of
Limitations for Child Sexual Abuse Offenses: A Time for Reform Utilizing the Discovery Rule, 80 J.
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Mental health professionals now tend to believe individuals' claims of
sexual abuse" and many communities provide services to help incest vic-
tims become adult survivors.2 3 Increased media coverage also contrib-
utes to placing the problem of incest into society's general
consciousness.24
B. The Nature of the Incestuous Family
While the incestuous family may appear normal and well-adjusted to
the outsider,25 a closer look reveals that the family is dysfunctional, that
roles and relationships within the family are distorted, and that stress
and turmoil abound.26 The incestuous family does not provide the pro-
tection and nurturing traditionally associated with family life and neces-
sary to the healthy development of children.27 Rather, for the victim of
father-daughter incest, the family is a place of exploitation and betrayal,
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 842, 844 n.12 (1989). Reformers also promote the adoption of hearsay
exceptions for a child's out-of-court statements concerning abuse, removing competency tests for
child witnesses, the videotaping of testimony, and closing the courtroom during a child's testimony.
Id. at 84243. The author concludes that despite these reforms, states still have difficulty prosecuting
child sexual abuse cases. Id. at 843.
22. Researchers find that children rarely falsely accuse adults of sexual abuse. Indeed, victims
of childhood incestuous abuse are very reluctant to disclose that information. Furthermore, adult
survivors of incest, even those in therapy, are reluctant to disclose the abuse. See C. CoURm,
HEALING THE INCEST WOUND: ADULT SURVIVORS IN THERAPY (1988) (citing studies). For a
discussion of techniques to evaluate an allegation of sexual abuse, see K. Faller, Is the Child Victim
of Sexual Abuse Telling the Truth?, in OUT OF HARM'S WAY: READINGS ON CHILD SEXUAL
AUInus ITS PREVENTION AND TREATMENT 54 (Haden ed. 1986).
23. For a list of self-help groups and national organizations for incest victims, see E. BASS & L.
DAVIS, supra note 2 at 463-65.
24. Made for television movies such as Something About Amelia (ABC), and media coverage of
lawsuits involving child abuse have helped bring the problem of incest to the attention of the general
public. Wang, ChildAbuse Alertf, in OUT OF HARM'S WAY: READINGS ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE,
11S PREVENTION AND TREATMENT 10 (Haden ed. 1986). Something About Amelia portrays the
experiences of a young girl sexually abused by her father, including her disclosure of the abuse, her
mother's initial disbelief and anger towards the young girl, her father's removal from the home, and
finally his admission of the crime.
The subject of father-daughter incest is showing up in other media as well. In 1990, the rock
group Aerosmith released a rock ballad about a young woman who kills her incestuous father. Aer-
osmith, Janie's Got a Gun, PUMP (Warner Bros. 1990).
25. C. COURTOis, supra note 22, at 57.
26. Id. at 57-58. The social factors conducive to the development of incest include a high level
of stress within the family, social isolation, the opportunity for sexual contact, and a sexualized
environment. Each of these conditions are dysfunctional in and of themselves. Id. at 59.
27. W. MALTZ & R. HOLMAN, INCEST AND SEXuALrrY - A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING
AND HEALING 25 (1987).
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a place where she feels trapped.28
Incestuous fathers are a diverse group.2 9 Yet, researchers find that fa-
thers who commit incest share common characteristics, including a
traditional family orientation, poor impulse control, overdependency,
low self-esteem and insensitivity to the needs of other people.30 An inces-
tuous father often abuses alcohol or drugs, which tends to disinhibit his
impulse control.31 Lacking control over his impulses, the incestuous fa-
ther uses his daughter to meet his own needs, while completely disre-
garding his parental obligation to protect and nurture her.32
A number of conditions impair a mother's ability to protect her daugh-
28. Many victims of incest leave their families at a young age to escape the abuse. Unfortu-
nately, many such victims are financially and emotionally unequipped to live on their own. Thus,
they are vulnerable to entering another abusive relationship. 3. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 92-94.
29. C. CoURTOis, supra note 22, at 48-49. Because incestuous fathers are such a heterogeneous
group, researchers find it useful to organize them by type: 1) the symbiotic father has strong unmet
needs for closeness and attempts to meet those needs through sex; 2) a father with a psychopathic-
sociopathic personality uses violence to achieve sex that is exciting and new to him; 3) the
pedophiliac incest offender is attracted to his daughter only when she is young, nonthreatening and
without secondary sexual characteristics; 4) the psychotic father experiences hallucinations and delu-
sions; and 5) the father comes from a cultural group or a family background which permits sexual
contact with children. Id. Eighty-five percent of all incestuous fathers fall into the symbiotic cate-
gory. rd. at 48-51.
30. Id. at 48. See also W. MALTZ & R. HOLMAN, supra note 27, at 16-17; Groth, Hobson and
Gary, The Child Molester: Clinical Observations, in OuT OF HARM'S WAY: READINGS ON CHILD
SEXUAL ABusE, ITS PREVENTION AND TREATMENT 147 (Haden ed. 1986).
31. R. GOLDMAN & V. WHEELER, supra note 15, at 23. The authors state that a "significant
proportion" of incestuous fathers abused alcohol and other substances. Id. In Herman's study, over
one-third of the women thought their fathers abused alcohol. J. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 76; see
also C. COURTOIS, supra note 22, at 50. Herman notes that incestuous fathers often seek to rational-
ize or excuse their behavior as the result of alcohol or drug abuse. While these substances do lower
inhibitions, they clearly are not the cause of the incestuous behavior. Experts recognize that treating
the substance abuse alone will not stop the incest. J. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 76.
32. Some authors suggest that if fathers were more involved in the care of their small children,
fewer would sexually abuse their children. They argue that early involvement in child rearing
strengthens the parent's protective and nurturing instincts towards the child and decreases the likeli-
hood that the parent will exploit the child for his own needs. See C. COURTOIS, supra note 22, at 52.
Many incestuous fathers were abused themselves, and thus believe that sexual, emotional, and physi-
cal abuse is a normal part of family life. Others rationalize their behavior, refusing to admit to
themselves or to anyone else that their behavior is harmful to their daughters. W. MALTZ & R.
HOLMAN, supra note 27, at 17. One researcher found that over half of the incest offenders studied
were incestuously abused as children. The study further found that half of the incest offenders
witnessed their fathers sexually abuse their sisters. This research suggests that early exposure to
incest is a strong predictor of later incestuous behavior. C. CouRTois, supra note 22, at 52.
Abusers rationalize their behavior by convincing themselves that their daughters are seducing
them, that the abuse is necessary "sex education," that they are giving their daughters special atten-
tion, that their daughters enjoy the abuse, or that they are keeping the family together by not going
outside the family for sex. W. MALTZ & B. HOLMAN, supra note 27, at 18.
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ter from sexual abuse by a father. The mother in an incestuous family is
often physically absent from the home or suffering from physical illness
or emotional problems.33 An alcoholic or abusive husband may also
render the mother powerless.34
33. J. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 77. A mother's permanent absence may also be explained by
her death, the loss of custody of the children in a divorce proceeding, or her voluntarily relinquish-
ment of custody. A mother may be temporarily absent due to childbirth, caring for sick relatives, or
because of her work schedule. C. COURToIs, supra note 22, at 54. Herman reports that in one study
of incestuous families, 33% of the mothers suffered from a serious physical illness. Furthermore, she
reports that in another study of 795 college students, the likelihood of sexual abuse increased almost
two-fold when the mother was often ill. J. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 47. Mothers in incestuous
families are often survivors of sexual abuse themselves. Such mothers often suffer lasting emotional
effects manifesting themselves in depression or anxiety. These women's relationships with their hus-
bands are often themselves destructive. W. MALTZ & B. HOLMAN, supra note 27, at 19. Other
social conditions may also render women helpless to protect their daughters, including lack of edu-
cation, poor work experience, early marriages, and large families. J. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 48.
34. In her study of forty victims of father-daughter incest, Herman found that over half of the
women reported that their fathers used violence repeatedly and that they saw their fathers beat their
mothers. J. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 73-74; see also Wattenberg, supra note 19, at 207-08 (mothers
in incestuous families "are frightened into submission by the terrorizing tactics of battering hus-
bands"). Traditional mental health professionals and feminist researchers disagreee as to the role
mothers play in the development of father-daughter incest. J. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 43. Tradi-
tional mental health doctrine holds that the failure of a mother to fulfill her traditional roles, espe-
cially her sexual responsibilities, forces the daughter to assume the responsibilities of the mother. Id.
Under this view, mothers may fail to fulfill their responsibilities in three ways. First, the literature
states or at least implies that incest occurs when the mother does not provide her husband with sex.
A frigid, hostile, unloving, unattractive, and cold wife forces the father to turn to his daughter for
sexual gratification. A second way in which traditional mental health literature implicates the
mother is by focusing on maternal absence as a causative factor. The literature states that the
mother is often ill, incapacitated in some way, or emotionally unavailable. Her absence forces the
daughter to take her place. The third indictment against mothers is the idea that mothers know and
acquiesce in father-daughter incest cases. Id.; see also Wattenberg, supra note 19, at 206.
Feminist researchers and mental health professionals reject these indictments of the mother. Wat-
tenberg regards the traditional views as myths resulting from gender biases held by researchers and
faulty research methods. Wattenberg, supra note 19, at 207-09. Herman also believes that the tradi-
tional view of the mother's role in father-daughter incest is a biased and unfair one. J. HERMAN,
supra note 1, at 4347. She points out that offenders in even the most disturbed families are usually
able to demand sex from their wives. Herman concludes, however, that the sexual availability of the
mother is irrelevant. A woman is not required to perform sexually any time her husband demands,
and her right to refuse does not entitle him to seek sex from his daughters. Moreover, while mater-
nal absence is a reality in many incestuous families, traditional mental health literature fails to sup-
port its assumption that the daughter must take on the caretaking role. Herman states that "[t]he
idea that the father might be expected to take on the mother's caretaking role is never entertained."
J. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 46. Finally, the fact that many women react to disclosures of incest
with outrage and prompt action refutes the idea that most mothers acquiesce in father-daughter
incest. Of the small percentage of mothers who are aware of the incest, yet do nothing to protect
their daughters, many "have been rendered unusually powerless within their families." J. HERMAN,
supra note 1, at 47.
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An incestuous father is most likely to abuse the oldest daughter in the
family- 5 The incest may begin during the child's preschool years, la-
tency years, or during adolescence.3 6
Secrecy is an essential element of the incestuous relationship.3 7 The
majority of incest victims do not tell anyone about the incest while living
at home. 8 Many factors combine to silence the victim of incest, thus
keeping the incestuous relationship intact.39 Some perpetrators threaten
psychological or physical harm to the victim or other family members if
the secret is revealed.' Some victims fail to disclose the incest because of
the shame, guilt, and stigma attached to involvement in a forbidden ac-
tivity like incest.41 Finally, some victims are simply unable to control the
rage caused by the sexual abuse.42
For any or all of these reasons, a victim of father-daughter incest is
unlikely to tell anyone about the abuse as long as she is living with her
35. C. COURTOiS, supra note 22, at 55.
36. Id. at 55-56. The type of sexual abuse often varies according to the age of the child. The
younger the child, the less likely that the sexual abuse will involve intercourse or other types of
penetration. Id.
37. J. HERMAN, supra note 1, at 70.
38. Herman's study of forty survivors of father-daughter incest found that 58% did not tell
anyone about the incest while living at home. Id. at 84.
39. C. COURToIS, supra note 22, at 132-34.
40. Id at 133. Threats of psychological harm include rejection, blaming, and abandonment.
Threats of physical harm include battering, mutilation, suicide, or death. Id.
41. Id. at 133.
42. See generally Ellenson, Horror, Rage, and Defenses in the Symptoms of Female Sexual
Abuse Survivors, 70 SoCIAL CASEWORK 589 (1989). The rage experienced by incest survivors has
been described as "cataclysmic." Id. at 592. Survivors deny their rage for several different reasons.
First, survivors deny their rage because of a fear of "ego fragmentation" or a "disruption of ego
functions"--what we call "going crazy." Id. at 592-93. Second, survivors defend against their rage
to protect "representations of parents formed before sexual abuse began and hopeful representations
of parents as being yet capable of giving them love, empathy and acceptance." Id. at 593. Third, the
survivor fears her rage will result in physical violence. For example, one survivor arose from her
sleep, attacked the members of her household, and later remembered nothing about the violence she
committed. Id. Finally, rage is a painful emotion and causes low self-esteem. Id.
A daughter involved in father-daughter incest may remain silent in hopes of keeping the family
intact or protecting other family members from the pain of knowing about the incest. C. CoURTois,
supra note 22, at 133. The victim may promise not to disclose the incest as a means of protecting
younger siblings from her father's abuse. W. MALTZ & R. HOLMAN, supra note 27, at 27. Because
an incestuous father's advances are rarely limited to one daughter, a victim may agree to keep silent
if her father promises not to abuse her sisters. C. CoURTOIS, supra note 22, at 134. A daughter may
not disclose abuse because past disclosures resulted only in disbelief and escalated abuse. C. COUR-
TOiS, supra note 22, at 133. Finally, given their history of exploitation, incest victims may find it
difficult to trust anyone enough to disclose the abuse. W. MALTz & R. HOLMAN, supra note 27, at
25.
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father. Without disclosure, intervention by other adults is impossible.
The child remains vulnerable to her father's incestuous behavior and its
harmful consequences.
C. The Harmful Effects of Father-Daughter Incest
The sexual abuse of any child is extremely damaging." When the
abuse is inflicted by a member of the family, however, the harm to the
child is even more severe." Children suffer a number of harmful effects
at the time of the incest or immediately thereafter.4" The initial emo-
tional consequences of incest include low self-esteem, anxiety, fear, con-
fusion, guilt, anger, and depression.46 The behavioral and physical
symptoms vary depending upon the child's developmental stage and her
level of physical, psychological, and sexual maturity.47
The effects and symptoms of incestuous abuse continue to develop
43. According to one study, one-fifth to two-fifths of all sexually abused children manifest path-
ological disturbance immediately following the abuse. C. COURTOIS, supra note 22, at 89. The
negative effects continued into adulthood, with twenty percent of sexual abuse victims showing seri-
ous psychopathology during their adult years. Id.
44. Id. at 89, 94. Researchers have found that certain characteristics of childhood abuse are
associated with the severest reactions in victims, and that these characteristics are found more often
in incest cases than in other types of child sexual abuse cases. Id. at 94. These characteristics
include: "abuse of longer duration and frequency, abuse involving closer relatives. . ., a large age
difference between victim and perpetrator, abuse perpetrated by males, sexual behavior which is
more serious and involves penetration, greater use of force and coercion, and multiple abuse exper-
iences." Id.
45. W. MALTZ & R. HOLMAN, supra note 27, at 24-28.
46. See Adams-Tucker, Defense Mechanisms Used by Sexually Abused Children, in OUT OF
HARM'S WAY: READINGS ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, ITS PREVENTION AND TREATMENT 72, 74
(Haden ed. 1986) (study of 27 sexually abused children found that only one child showed increased
self-esteem following the abuse).
The anxiety and fear experienced by sexually abused children may manifest itself in compulsive
behavior and phobias, sleep disturbances, perceptual distortions, dissociative reactions, mood
swings, hypervigilance, and hyperactivity. C. COURTOIS, supra note 22, at 101-02. The child may
also experience a sense of loss and grieving. Id. The sleep disturbances experienced by abused chil-
dren include nightmares, night terrors, and fear of sleeping alone. Id. The types of phobias include
the fear of being blamed, of being abandoned, of causing a family breakup, of hurting other family
members, or of retaliation by the offender. Id. A child's negative self-image can manifest itself in
withdrawal, risk-taking behavior and disregard for self, and self-inflicted defeats and injuries. Id.
47. Id. at 96-98. Common behavioral changes in younger victims of sexual abuse include with-
drawal, loss of appetite, regressive behavior such as bedwetting, whining, unexplained gagging, age-
inappropriate sexual knowledge, and excessive masturbation often resulting in genital infection. W.
MALTZ & R. HOLMAN, supra note 27, at 25.
Sexually abused children learn to think of sexual interaction as a means of expressing affection.
Faller, Is the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse Telling the Truth?, in OUT OF HARM'S WAY: READINGS
ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, ITS PREVENTION AND TREATMENT 54,62 (Haden ed. 1986). They may
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throughout a victim's life.4" Adult survivors experience anxiety and fear,
manifested by anxiety attacks, sleep disturbances, nightmares, and vari-
ous phobias.49 Adult survivors often develop negative self-images 0 and
experience chronic depression, which may result in self-damaging behav-
iors, such as self-mutilation and suicide attempts.51 Other victims suffer
from addictive and compulsive behaviors, such as alcoholism and eating
disorders.52 Some adult survivors suffer from physical and somatic ef-
fects and symptoms, including discomfort and pain related to the type
and locus of the abuse.53
Incestuous abuse also affects the adult survivor's interpersonal rela-
tionships and sexual functioning.54 Survivors are often either sexually
attempt to initiate sexual encounters with peers, elicit sexual responses from adults, or become sexu-
ally active to the point of promiscuity. Id.
Other behaviors common to older victims of sexual abuse include substance abuse, eating disor-
ders, running away from home, inhibition of speech and movement, recurrent physical pain, suicide
attempts, acting out sexually, and engaging in actions that bring attention to themselves. W. MALTZ
& R. HOLMAN , supra note 27, at 25; see also Morrow & Sorek, Factors Affecting Self-Esteem, Depres-
sion, and Negative Behavior in Sexually Abused Female Adolescents, 51 J. OF MARRIAGE & T"E
FAm. 677 (1989).
48. D. RUSSELL, supra note 15, at 139-40. The degree of trauma experienced by adult survi-
vors is related to the severity of the abuse, the frequency and duration of the abuse, the amount of
force used, as well as other factors. Id. at 142-54. Long-term effects of incest are classified as either
chronic manifestations of acute aftereffects or delayed reactions to the abuse. C. COURTOIS, supra
note 22, at 104.
49. C. COURTOIS, supra note 22, at 104-05.
50. Id. at 105. Many adult survivors think they are bad people. Id. They feel that they did
something to cause the abuse. Id. These feelings are often reinforced by the fact that no one inter-
vened to help them or by the abuser's statements that the victim liked the abuse or was at fault. 1d.
51. C. COURTOIS, supra note 22, at 105; . HERMAN, supra note 1, at 99. Recent studies indi-
cate that victims of abuse do not suffer from depression any more frequently than the general popu-
lation. C. COURTOIS, supra note 22, at 105. However, such a victim is more likely than a member of
the general population to have self-destructive thoughts or to engage in self-destructive behavior. Id.
For a discussion of the self-damaging behaviors incest victims may exhibit and treatment issues, see
C. COURTOIS, supra note 24, at 301-08.
52. Id. at 311-15. Female survivors may develop eating disorders as a means of protecting
themselves from further abuse. W. MALTZ & R. HOLMAN, supra note 27, at 48. Thus, the victim
undereats because thinness gives her a boyish appearance, or overeats because it gives her a less
attractive body. Id.
53. C. COURTOIS, supra note 22, at 106-07. Incest victims may experience physical effects re-
lated specifically to the locus of the abuse, such as nausea, gagging, vomiting, or choking. Id. at 106.
More generalized physical effects may also result, such as migraine headaches, high blood pressure,
frozen joints, ringing in the ears, hyperalertness, and hypervigilance. Id. at 106-07. Adult survivors
often appear at war with their bodies, blaming them for the abuse. On the other hand, some incest
survivors disregard their bodies so completely that they become unaware of the need to eat and sleep.
Id. at 106.
54. See W. MALTZ & R. HOLMAN, supra note 27, at 52 ("incest profoundly influences what
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withdrawn or sexually promiscuous."5 The incest may also affect the vic-
tim's sexual preference and orientation. 6 Furthermore, adult survivors
may experience problems in the areas of sexual arousal, response, and
satisfaction.57 Adult survivors may experience difficulties in forming
close personal relationships with either men or women. 8 They also may
experience difficulties in forming intimate relationships and raising their
own children.59
Many women do not realize the harmful consequences of the incest
until some years after the abuse has ended.' Incest victims engage in
repression, denial, avoidance, and dissociation to protect themselves
from the trauma of the sexual abuse.61 Often, these defense mechanisms
continue well into adulthood.62 Because the adult survivor is often
asymptomatic, she is unaware of her need to resolve the problems stem-
uing from the abuse. 3 However, a significant event in the victim's life
can often break through the psychological defense mechanisms and pre-
cipitate a crisis in her life.11 This breakdown of defenses causes a flood of
female survivors learn about sex and what they come to believe is expected sex role behavior").
Survivors become submissive, believing that their needs are unimportant and that they have no con-
trol over sex. Id.
55. Id. at 69-70. Some adult survivors alternate between the two extremes. C. CouRTois,
supra note 22, at 107-08. Whether through withdrawal or promiscuity, adult survivors attempt to
gain control over their bodies and their sexuality. Id.
56. W. MALTZ & R. HOLMAN, supra note 27, at 72-75. Heterosexual women may choose
sexual relations with women as part of their healing process. Id. Childhood sexual abuse may ob-
scure a lesbian woman's preference for female partners. Id.
57. Id. at 75-79. Adult survivors may experience flashbacks during sex, making them feel they
are reliving the abuse. Id. Some adult survivors may engage in dissociation or derealization during
sex, losing emotional or cognitive touch with reality. Id.
58. C. COURTOIS, supra note 22, at 111-13. Adult survivors perceive the trust and openness
necessary to a relationship as threatening. They may instead choose an abusive partner, thus reen-
acting their childhood role. Id. at 111-12.
59. Id. at 112-13. A lack of a positive role model may contribute to an adult survivor's inability
to parent her own children. Id. Survivors experience difficulty with both sons and daughters, fear-
ing that sons will become abusers and daughters will become victims. Id.
60. Id. at 129-62.
61. See generally Adams-Tucker, Defense Mechanisms Used by Sexually Abused Children, in
OUT OF HARM'S WAY: READINGS ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE, ITS PREVENTION AND TREATMENT
(Haden ed. 1986). The type of defense mechanism used varies with the age and gender of the victim,
the identity of the abuser, and the amount of support the victim receives after disclosure. Id. at 74-
80.
62. C. CoURTOIS, supra note 22, at 94.
63. See id. at 130-62. Often, only professional counseling will enable the adult survivor to
connect the abuse and her present problems. Id. Sometimes a survivor enters counseling for one
problem, only to find that the problem is an aftereffect of the abuse. Id.
64. Id. at 137. Examples of such significant events include intimate relationships, marriage,
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memories, emotions, and symptoms to ensue.6
Women may suffer long lasting and substantial harm as a result of
father-daughter incest.66 Some women seek compensation for their inju-
ries through the civil court system. Before a court decides whether to
award damages to an incest victim, it must find that her suit is timely
under the governing statute of limitations.
II. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND THE DISCOVERY RULE
A. Purpose, Application and Traditional Exceptions
State statutes of limitation govern the time period in which a plaintiff
may file suit.6 7  Statutes of limitation serve two primary purposes.68
First, they protect potential defendants from defending against stale
claims and allow them to plan for the future without fear of protracted
litigation.69 Second, they insure accurate factflnding by requiring the
processing of claims before evidence is lost through the destruction or
disappearance of physical evidence, the death or disappearance of wit-
nesses, or the fading of memories.70
A statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action ac-
pregnancy, the birth of a child, illness, death, separation, and divorce. Id. at 137-38. Other survi-
vors remember the abuse when they break an addiction, whether to food, drugs or alcohol. Id.
Viewing media coverage of sexual abuse can also trigger memories of the abuse. E. BAss & L.
DAVIS, supra note 2, at 75-78.
65. This stage in the survivor's life is often called the emergency stage. E. BASS & L. DAVIS,
supra note 2, at 65-69. In this stage, the survivor may continually think about the incest, have
frequent flashbacks and become very emotional and unable to function at a normal level.
The crisis stage often requires the immediate attention of mental health professionals. C. COUR-
TOis, supra note 22, at 139. Though individual or group therapy is often all that is required, some
instances require sedation and hospitalization. Id.
66. Because of their tendency to develop symptoms long after the infliction of the abuse, many
mental health professionals diagnose adult survivors of incest as suffering from post traumatic stress
disorder. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 250-51 (3d ed. revised
1987). Post traumatic stress disorder is characterized by the patient developing symptoms long after
the occurrence of a psychologically distressing event. Id. Common symptoms include re-experienc-
ing the event, avoidance of stimuli associated with the event or a numbing response, and increased
arousal when exposed to stimuli associated with the event. Id.
67. Most statutes of limitation provide that "all actions... shall be brought within [X] years"
or that "no action.., shall be brought after [i years" from the date the cause of action accrued.
See Developments in the Law. Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1179 (1950) [herein-
after Developments].
68. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979).
69. Id. See also Callahan, Statutes of Limitations--Background, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 130 (1955).
70. 'Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117.
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crues 71 Generally, the cause of action is deemed to accrue either from
the time the defendant commits the wrongful act or the time when the
injury occurs. 2 An intentional tort creates an immediate right to nomi-
nal damages,73 thus, the limitations period in such cases generally begins
to run from the time of the wrongful act, regardless of when the harm is
sustained.74 In contrast, because harm is an essential element of a negli-
gence action, the statutory period in such actions normally does not com-
mence until the plaintiff realizes harm.7 5
Courts do not strictly apply the statute of limitations in all cases, often
postponing or suspending the limitations period when the defendant's
conduct makes it equitable to do SO. 76 Incest survivors frequently invoke
71. Developments, supra note 67, at 1200.
72. Id. This distinction is only relevant if the two events do not occur simultaneously. Id.
73. Bumgart v. Bailey, 247 Miss. 604, 156 So.2d 823 (1963) (damages from assault occur imme-
diately); Mason v. Wrightson, 205 Md. 481, 109 A.2d 128 (1954) (false imprisonment and assault
and battery).
74. Developments, supra note 67, at 1200-01; see also Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150, 153
(Tex. 1967) (citing 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 168, at 123; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 899 (1965)). Because a victim may not realize harm immediately after abuse this construc-
tion of the limitations period works a hardship on plaintiffs in civil incest cases. See infra notes 112-
116 and accompanying text.
75. Martin v. Edwards Labs. Div. of American Hosp. Supply Corp., 60 N.Y.2d 417, 469
N.Y.S. 923, 457 N.E.2d 1150 (1983) (limitations period begins to run from date of injury caused by
faulty implantation of artificial heart valve); Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 Mass. 739, 374
N.E.2d 582 (1978) (products liability); White v. Schnoebelen, 91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941)
(negligent installation of lightning rod).
76. Thus, courts will toll the running of a statute of limitations when 1) the defendant fraudu-
lently conceals the existence of the plaintiff's cause of action, Atlantic City Electric Co. v. General
Electric Co., 312 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909 (1963) (Clayton Act); DeRuger-
iis v. Brener, 471 Pa. 103, 348 A.2d 139 (1975) (identity of automobile driver withheld); 2) the
defendant induces the plaintiff to forebear from bringing suit, Southern Cal. Enter., Inc. v. D.N. &
E. Walter & Co., 78 Cal. App. 2d 750, 178 P.2d 785 (1947) (breach of warranty); McNeill v. Simp-
son, 39 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. 1931); 3) the defendant is outside the state when the cause of action
accrues, American Surety Co. v. Gainfort, 123 F. Supp. 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (applying California
law in judgment creditors suit); Bratton v. Trojan Boat Co., 19 Mich. App. 236, 172 N.W.2d 457
(1969), aff'd, 385 Mich. 585, 189 N.W.2d 206 (1971) (service of foreign corporation in products
liability case); 4) the defendant has died and a personal representative has yet to be appointed,
Lydem v. Feldman, 36 Conn. Sup. 121, 414 A.2d 202 (1979) (automobile accident); Carpenter v.
Johnson, 514 S.W.2d 868 (Tenn. 1974); 5) the plaintiff is underage, Edmonds v. Union Pacific R.R.
Co., 294 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Kan. 1969) (personal injuries); Hun v. Center Properties, 63 Haw. 273,
626 P.2d 182 (1981) (wrongful death); 6) the plaintiff is insane, Hill v. Clark Equip. Co., 42 Mich.
App. 405, 202 N.W.2d 530 (1972); Barnett v. Ashley, 89 Ga. App. 679, 81 S.E.2d 11 (1954) (insuffi-
cient evidence of weakness of mind); and 7) the plaintiff is imprisoned, Gaudette v. Webb, 362 Mass.
60, 284 N.W.2d 222 (1972) (automobile accident); Matthews v. Matthews, 177 So.2d 497 (Fla. App.
1965) (administrator allowed to bring suit after expiration of statutory period).
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the insanity exception77 to persuade courts to toll the statute of limita-
tions.7 8 Most courts reject such attempts, finding that incest survivors do
not meet the statutory test for the insanity exception.7 9 Though ac-
knowledging that incest victims suffer emotional problems as a result of
the abuse, courts reason that such problems generally do not render them
insane or unable to function in society.80
B. The Discovery Rule
Incest survivors most often rely upon the discovery rule to argue that a
court should find their claims timely under the governing statute of limi-
tations.8" They argue that the limitations period is tolled until a victim
77. See supra note 76. Incest survivors have also attempted to invoke other traditional excep-
tions. See Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (finding issue of fact pre-
cluding summary judgment as to whether accrual of the cause of action delayed on the grounds of
fraudulent concealment); E.W. and D.W. v. DCH, 754 P.2d 817 (Mont. 1988) (fraudulent conceal-
ment); DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 377-78 (1987) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that claim was timely under the theory of equitable estoppel); John R. v. Oak-
land Unified School Dis., 48 Cal. 3d 438, 256 Cal. Rptr. 766, 769 P.2d 948, 951 (1959) (remanding
for determination of whether teacher charged with molestation of a student equitably estopped from
pleading the statute of limitations). For further discussion of the equitable estoppel theory in civil
sexual abuse cases, see Rosenfeld, The Statute of Limitations Barrier in Childhood Sexual Abuse
Cases The Equitable Estoppel Remedy, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 206 (1989).
78. See Smith v. Smith, 830 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1987) (refusing to apply insanity exception to toll
the statute of limitations); DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 101, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987)
(refusing to apply the insanity exception to toll the statute of limitations); Altena v. Altena, 428
N.W.2d 315 (Ct. App. Iowa 1988) (reversing jury decision that plaintiff fell within the mentally ill
exception to the two year statute of limitations period for personal injuries); Meirs-Post v. Schafer,
170 Mich. App. 174, 427 N.W.2d 606 (1988) (holding that statute of limitations tolled under in-
sanity exception if plaintiff could prove she repressed memories of sexual abuse and if there was
corroborating evidence for plaintiff's testimony that the abuse occurred); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 556
N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (refusing to apply insanity exception to toll the statute of
limitations); Peters v. Medaglia, No. 130,588 (Ohio App. April 13, 1989) (WESTLAW, 1989 WL
36709).
79. Smith, 830 F.2d at 12-13; DeRose, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79; Altena, 428 N.W.2d at 317;
Hoffman, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 609; Peters, 1989 WL 36709, at 5.
80. Smith, 830 F.2d at 12; DeRose, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 378; Altena, 428 N.W.2d at 317. Accept-
ance of the insanity argument is also potentially detrimental to female victims of incest. Commenta-
tors indicate that the use of the insanity defense in battered women cases perpetuates the stereotype
that women are irrational and hysterical. Schneider & Jordon, Representation of Women Who De-
fend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 149, 159-60.
The use of the insanity exception to toll the statute of limitations in civil incest suits is likely to
perpetuate the same stereotype. Id.
81. See Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F. Supp. 1512 (1990); Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp.
1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Evans v. Eckelman, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1609, 265 Cal. Rpr. 605 (1990); Doe v.
Doe, 216 Cal. App. 3d 285, 264 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1989); Lindabury v. Lindabury, 552 So.2d 1117 (Fla.
App. 1989); Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); E.W. and D.W. v. DCH, 754 P.2d 817
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discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the nature of her inju-
ries and the causal connection to the earlier sexual abuse.8 2
The Supreme Court first recognized the discovery rule in Urie v.
Thompson. 3 In Urie, an employee brought suit against the Missouri Pa-
cific Railroad for injuries sustained after thirty years of inhaling silica
dust while on the job.84 The railroad argued that the applicable three-
year statute of limitations barred Urie's claim because the exposure
caused him to contract the disease long before he brought suit." The
Supreme Court rejected the railroad's argument, stating that it would
leave Urie with only a "delusive remedy."8 6 Instead, the Court held that
the statute of limitations did not bar the suit, because his symptoms did
not appear and he could not have known he had silicosis prior to that
date. 7 The Court reasoned that the legislature did not intend to bar the
suit of a blamelessly ignorant plaintiff.88
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Urie, courts apply the discovery
rule to insure that the statute of limitations does not bar a blamelessly
ignorant plaintiff's suit. 9 In Wilson v. Johns-Manville,90 for example, an
employee's widow brought suit in 1979 against manufacturers of asbestos
products, alleging that the products caused her husband's pulmonary ill-
ness and death. Beginning in 1941, Wilson worked as an insulation
worker at various construction sites.91 As part of his job, he regularly
handled asbestos and asbestos products.92 In 1973, Wilson learned that
(Mont. 1988); Kaiser v. Milliman, 50 Wash. App. 235, 747 P.2d 1130 (1988); Hammer v. Hammer,
142 Wis.2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (1987); DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr.
368 (1987); Raymond v. Ingram, 47 Wash. App. 781, 737 P.2d 314 (1987).
82. See, eg., Johnson, 701 F. Supp. at 1370.
83. 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
84. Id. at 165-66. The plaintiff brought suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45
U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1986), and the Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C. § 23 et seq. (1986).
85. Urie, 337 U.S. at 169. For a discussion of latent disease cases in the context of statutes of
limitation, see Note, Claim Preclusion in Modern Latent Disease Cases: A Proposal for Allowing
Second Suits, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1989 (1990).
86. Urie, 337 U.S. at 169; cf. Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (balancing unfairness to plaintiff of losing any real opportunity for compensation against un-
fairness of defending against stale claims to decide whether to apply the discovery rule).
87. Urie, 337 U.S. at 170.
88. Id.
89. See Mann v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1984) ("Dalkon Shield" case);
Hamilton v. Turner, 377 A.2d 363 (Del. 1977) (inter-uterine device); Society of Mt. Carmel v. Fox,
90 Ill. App. 3d 537, 413 N.E.2d 480 (1980) (design defect in building).
90. 684 F.2d 111, 113-14 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
91. Id. at 112.
92. Id. at 112-13.
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he had contracted asbestosis,93 and in 1978, after suffering two heart at-
tacks and a collapsed lung, Wilson was diagnosed as suffering from
mesothelioma, a type of cancer.94
To resolve the statute of limitations issue, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals applied the discovery rule.95 The manufacturers ar-
gued, however, that Wilson's cause of action accrued, at the latest, when
he first knew or reasonably should have known that he was suffering
from an asbestos-related disease, that is, in 1973 when Wilson learned he
had asbestosis.96 The court disagreed, finding that the 1973 diagnosis of
"mild asbestosis" did not trigger the statute of limitations on his right to
sue for the disease of mesothelioma, which resulted from the same asbes-
tos exposure but did not manifest itself until 1978. 91 Rather, the Court
held that Wilson's cause of action accrued and the statute began to run
when Wilson learned he suffered from mesothelioma.98
To support its conclusion, the court examined the purposes of the stat-
ute of limitations.99 The court noted that while the defendant's approach
best served the interest in protecting defendants against stale claims, toll-
ing the statute until 1978 furthered the evidentiary purpose of insuring
accurate factfinding; evidence concerning the existence of a latent dis-
ease, its proximate cause, and the resultant damage tends to increase
rather than disappear over time."° The court further noted that in per-
sonal injury and wrongful death cases, the community, through the pro-
cess of adjudication, seeks to compensate the plaintiff adequately. 101 The
93. Id. at 113. Asbestosis is a "fibrous induration of the lungs due to irritation caused by the
inhalation of [asbestos] dust." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DIcIoNARY 116, 990 (3d unabr. law. ed.
1972) quoted in Wilson, 684 F.2d at 113 n.3.
94. Wilson, 684 F.2d at 113. Mesothelial cells are flattened cells forming an epithelium that
lines the membranes enveloping the lungs and the heart. Id. at 113 n.7 (citing STEDMAN'S, supra
note 93, at 768, 942, 983).
95. Id. at 117. The Court noted a clear trend toward application of the discovery rule in latent
disease cases. Id. at 116 (collecting cases).
96. Id. at 114.
97. Id. at 120-21. Johns-Manville argued that to allow a separate cause of action for mesothe-
lioma amounted to a splitting of Urie's cause of action. Id. at 117.
98. Id. at 120-21.
99. Id. at 118-19. The court noted that statutes of limitation serve two purposes. Id. at 118.
First, they aid accurate fact-finding by preventing the loss of evidence through "death or disappear-
ance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise." Id. at 118-19 (citing
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979)). Second, they protect defendants' interests "in
planning for the future without the uncertainty inherent" in defending stale claims. Id. at 119. See
supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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court determined that a rule requiring plaintiffs to file suit as soon as the
first manifestations of a disease appeared would frustrate this purpose.102
According to the traditional rule of recovery a plaintiff may recover dam-
ages based on future consequences only if such consequences are reason-
ably certain; 3 a plaintiff suffering from a latent disease, therefore, may
recover only for the harm that is already manifest. Thus, the court found
that requiring a plaintiff to file suit upon the earliest manifestations of a
disease leaves plaintiff uncompensated for the most serious harm.1 4
In addition to latent disease cases, courts apply the discovery rule in
product liability cases 05 and professional malpractice cases.106 Courts
will also apply the discovery rule in negligence cases when the plaintiff is
blamelessly ignorant of his injury or its cause."7 Courts are less willing,
however, to apply the discovery rule in intentional tort cases. The cause
of action accrues when the tort occurs without proof of harm.108
III. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO CIVIL INCEST SUITS
Courts considering whether to apply the discovery rule to toll the stat-
ute of limitations in civil incest suits face two different situations: First, a
plaintiff may not remember the abuse until after the statute of limitations
102. Id.
103. Id. at 119 n.42 (collecting cases).
104. Id. The court also noted that adoption of the defendant's rule would stimulate the filing of
many lawsuits by attorneys unwilling to risk losing a lawsuit by waiting to see if symptoms do in fact
appear. Id. The court further noted that once in court, such attorneys may attempt to prolong the
litigation until the full extent of the plaintiff's condition is known. Id.
105. See Mann v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 741 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1984) (cause of action accrued
when plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that a Dalkon Shield caused her endometri-
osis); Franzen v. Deere & Co., 334 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1983) (products liability); but see Johnson v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 174 (W.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd without op., 738 F.2d 422 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984) (plaintiff contended that exposure to DES caused cancer).
106. Courts have applied the discovery rule in a variety of malpractice suits: medical malprac-
tice suits, see Mateo v. Rish, 86 App. Div. 2d 736, 446 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1982); Hamilton v. Turner,
377 A.2d 363 (Del. 1977) (intra-uterine device); dental malpractice suits, see Paske v. Green, 142 Ill.
App. 3d 367, 491 N.E.2d 1195 (1986); McKee v. Williams, 23 Ohio App. 3d 187, 492 N.E.2d 461
(1985); Foster v. Harris, 633 S.W.2d 304 (Tenn. 1982); Shadle v. Pearce, 287 Pa. Super. 436, 430
A.2d 683 (1981); legal malpractice suits, see Levin v. Berley, 728 F.2d 551 (1st Cir. 1984); Yazzie v.
Olney, Levy, Kaplan, & Tenner, 593 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1979); accounting malpractice suits, see
Chisoim v. Schott, 86 N.M. 707, 526 P.2d 1300 (1974); Moonie v. Lynch, 256 Cal. App. 2d 361, 64
Cal. Rptr. 55 (1967); and in malpractice suits against engineers and architects, see Gevaart v. Metco
Constr., Inc., 111 Wash. 2d 499, 760 P.2d 348 (1988); Society of Mt. Carmel v. Fox, 90 Ill. App. 3d
537, 413 N.E.2d 480 (1980); Banner v. Town of Dayton, 474 P.2d 300 (Wyo. 1970); but see U-Haul
Co. of Western Georgia v. Abner & Robeson, Inc., 247 Ga. 565, 277 S.E.2d 497 (1981).
107. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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expires; 109 or second, a plaintiff may be aware of the sexual abuse, but
does not understand that her present injuries resulted from the abuse
until some time after the statute runs."1 However, plaintiffs in either
situation argue that they could not reasonably discover the essential ele-
ments of their causes of action during the period specified by the applica-
ble statute of limitations.11 Courts respond favorably to the discovery
rule argument for plaintiffs who repress memories of the sexual abuse," 2
but hesitate to toll the statute of limitations when the plaintiff remains
aware of the abuse. 113
A. Plaintiffs Who Repress Memories of the Abuse
In Johnson v. Johnson, I 4 a daughter filed suit against her father, alleg-
ing that he sexually abused her for a period of ten years. Though the
alleged abuse occurred over twenty years beforehand, the daughter
claimed that she repressed all memories of the abuse until she began psy-
109. See Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (plaintiff with multiple person-
alities claimed that her dominant personality had no conscious memories of the abuse); Lindabury v.
Lindabury, 552 So.2d 1117 (Fla. App. 1989) (plaintiff claimed that she began remembering the abuse
only after entering counseling); Doe v. Doe, 216 Cal. App. 3d 285, 264 Cal Rptr. 633 (1989) (same);
Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash.2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986) (same).
110. Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790
A.2d 578 (Vt. App. 1990) (father-son suit); Evans v. Eckelman, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1609, 265 Cal.
Rptr. 605 (1990); Bock v. Harmon, 526 So.2d 292 (La. App. 1988); Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis.
2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (1987); Raymond v. Ingram, 47 Wash. App. 781, 737 P.2d 314 (1987);
DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 101, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987).
111. Plaintiffs who have repressed their memories are unaware of the abuse, although they may
suffer from some harm during the statutory period. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp.
1363, 1365-66 (N.D. Il. 1988) (plaintiff developed multiple personalities before statute of limitations
expired). Plaintiffs who remember the abuse may fail to understand the nature of their injuries and
their connection to the abuse. Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23, 24-25 (1987)
(plaintiff suffered from depression). See supra notes 41-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the types of harm suffered by adult survivors and the tendency for delayed recognition.
112. See Johnson, 701 F. Supp. at 1359; Doe v. Doe, 216 Cal. App. 3d 285, 264 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1989); Peters v. Medaglia, No. 55208 (Ohio App. April 13, 1989) (WESTLAW, 1989 WL 36709).
Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 170 Mich. App. 174, 427 N.W.2d 606 (1988); but see Lindabury v. Linda-
bury, 552 So.2d 1117 (Fla. App. 1989); Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986).
113. Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 736 F. Supp. 1512 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790
A.2d 578 (Vt. App. 1990); Peters v. Medagla, No. 130,588 (Ohio App. April 13, 1989)
(WESTLAW, 1989 WL 36709); E.W. and D.W. v. DCH, 231 Mont. 481, 754 P.2d 817 (1988);
Kaiser v. Milliman, 50 Wash. App. 235, 747 P.2d. 1130 (1988); DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App.
3d 101, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987); Raymond v. Ingram, 47 Wash. App. 781, 737 P.2d 214 (1987);
but see Evans v. Eckeman, 216 Cal. App. 3d 1609, 265 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1990); Osland v. Osland, 442
N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257, 481 N.W.2d 23 (1987).
114. 701 F. Supp. 1363, 1364 (N.D. IIL. 1988). The daughter also named her mother as a defend-
ant, alleging that the mother failed to protect her from the abuse. Id.
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chotherapy. 1n The district court refused to bar the daughter's complaint
under the two-year statute of limitations. 1 6 The court emphasized the
unfairness of barring the claim of a plaintiff, who neither knows nor rea-
sonably should have known of the sexual abuse and its consequences at
the time of the acts. 1 7 The court noted that the states addressing the
issue apply the discovery rule when the plaintiff does not remember the
abuse.118
B. Plaintiff's Who Have Conscious Memories of the Abuse
In Hammer v. Hammer119 a fifteen-year-old, after ten years of being
sexually abused by her father several times a week, told her mother about
115. Id. The daughter claimed that because she repressed all memories of the alleged sexual
abuse, she was blamelessly ignorant of the causal connection between her father's acts and the inju-
ries she suffered. Id. at 1364-65.
The father argued that his daughter did not repress memories of the abuse and offered as proof
letters written by her three years prior to the lawsuit discussing the abuse. Id. at 1365. In response,
the daughter offered the testimony of her therapist, who stated that the daughter suffered from
Multiple Personality Disorder and that one of the daughter's other personalities wrote the letters.
Id. at 1365-66.
116. Id. at 1370. The parents argued that the Illinois two-year statute of limitations for personal
injury suits, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 13-202 (1987), barred their daughter's claim. Id. at 1366.
117. Id. at 1369-70. In reaching its decision, the court relied heavily upon the dissent in Tyson
v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986). Johnson, 701 F. Supp. at 1367-68. In Tyson, the
Washington Supreme Court held that the discovery rule did not apply to a civil incest claim in which
the plaintiff has blocked all memories of the abuse during the statutory time period and when no
objective evidence that the abuse actually occurred existed. 107 Wash. 2d at 79-80. The court con-
cluded that a literal reading of the statute of limitations struck the proper balance between the
possibility of stale claims and the plaintiff's right to sue. Id. The majority failed to see the harshness
of the result, stating that the plaintiff had a "reasonable opportunity to assert a claim" during the
three years following her attainment of majority. Id. at 279.
The dissent in Tyson would not require objective, verifiable evidence of the alleged act as a prereq-
uisite to applying the discovery rule. Id. at 80 (Pearson, J., dissenting). Rather, Justice Pearson
noted that the underlying principle of the discovery rule is fairness. Id. at 81. As such, he argued
for a test balancing the rights of the plaintiff and the defendant, to the exclusion of evidentiary
problems and the merits of the case. Id. at 83-84. After engaging in such a test, Justice Pearson
concluded that the discovery rule should apply in civil incest suits when the plaintiff represses all
conscious memory of the sexual abuse during the limitations period. Id. at 90. For a further discus-
sion of Tyson, see Note, The Discovery Rule and Father-Daughter Incest: A Legislative Response, 29
B.C.L. REv. 941 (1988).
In response to Tyson, the Washington legislature passed a law giving incest victims a more reason-
able time period in which to file suit against their abusers. See infra note 162 and accompanying
text.
118. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. at 1369.
119. 142 Wis. 2d 257, 418 N.W.2d 23 (1987).
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the abuse. 120 Her mother refused to believe her and the family blamed
the daughter.12' Ten years after the abuse ended, the daughter filed suit
against her father. 2 2 Her father argued that both the two-year limita-
tions period for assault and battery and the three-year limitations period
for injuries to the person resulting from negligence barred her claim. 121
The trial court rejected 2 ' the daughter's contention that the discovery
rule applied because she did not know the nature of the harm nor did she
understand its causal connection to the abuse until after the statute
ran. 125
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and
applied the discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations.' 26 The court
held that an incest victim's cause of action does not accrue until she dis-
covers, or in the exercise of due diligence should discover, "the fact and
cause of her injury."' 127 The court rejected the argument that because the
daughter suffered harm at the time of the incest and was aware of that
harm, her cause of action accrued at the time of the act. 28 The court
120. 418 N.W.2d at 24. The father threatened his daughter with physical violence if she ever
told anyone about the abuse. He also told her that she was to blame for the incest. Id.
121. Id. at 24-25. The father convinced the entire family that the daughter was to blame for the
family's problems. Id. For a discussion of the factors that keep incest victims from disclosing their
abuse, see supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
122. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 24.
123. Id. (citing Wis. STAT. §§ 893.57 (assault and battery) and 893.54 (1987-88) (negligence)).
124. The trial court reasoned that the legislature was the proper body to extend the statutory
time period, not the courts. Id. See also Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 25-26.
125. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 24-25. The daughter's counselor submitted an affidavit listing
reasons why the daughter had not perceived the incest as harmful until she began counseling. Id. at
24. His reasons were as follows: (1) the abuse happened so often and for such a long period of time
that she saw it as natural, (2) her father imposed isolation and secrecy on her, (3) the abuse caused
her to view herself as an object without rights, (4) her father told her that the incestuous conduct
was normal, and (5) her father's betrayal made her distrustful of other authority figures in a position
to help her. Id. at 25.
The daughter alleged that her father's efforts to obtain custody of her younger sister triggered
severe emotional problems. She alleged that it was not until she obtained psychotherapy that she
began to understand the nature of her injuries and their connection to her abuse. Id. at 25.
126. Id. at 26.
127. Id. at 26. The court concluded that the authority and dominion exercised by the father,
combined with the daughter's own feelings of guilt, depression, and dissociation, precluded her from
understanding the nature of her injuries and their cause. Id. at 26. The court's inclusion of a causal
element is important. Other courts refuse to include a causal element in the discovery rule, thus
foreclosing the possibility that a incest victim who does not repress memories of the abuse can have a
timely claim. See E.W. and D.W. v. DCH, 231 Mont. 481, 754 P.2d 817 (1988); DeRose v. Cars-
well, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987); Raymond v. Ingram, 47 Wash. App. 781,
737 P.2d 314, 317 (1987).
128. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 27.
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noted that claims do not necessarily accrue with the first manifestations
of an injury. 12 9 Furthermore, the court concluded that the unfairness to
incest victims resulting from a strict application of the statute of limita-
tions demands that they have time to more fully understand the nature
and cause of their injuries. 130
Most courts respond less favorably than the Hammer court to the ar-
guments of incest survivors who do not repress all memories of the
abuse. 131 DeRose v. Carswell132 is more typical of judicial response in
these types of cases. In DeRose, the plaintiff alleged that her step-grand-
father sexually abused her while she was a child.1 33 The plaintiff ified
suit against her grandfather thirteen years after the abuse ended and five
years after she reached maturity.1 34 The plaintiff argued that her suit
was timely under the governing one-year statute of limitations because
although she was aware of the abuse, she experienced a delayed response
to the abuse and did not understand the connection between her emo-
tional problems and the abuse. 135
The California Court of Appeals refused to apply the discovery rule to
toll the statute of limitations. 136 The court reasoned that because the
plaintiff experienced harm at the time of the abuse as a matter of law, the
discovery rule did not apply. 1 3  The court concluded that the plaintiff's
delayed injuries and her ignorance of the causal connection between the
injuries sustained and the abuse inflicted were insufficient reasons to ap-
129. Id. at 26. Cf DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 374-77
(1987) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the statute of limitations did not bar her claim because her
later injuries constituted a separate claim).
130. Hammer, 418 N.W.2d at 27.
131. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. Courts reason that because the plaintiff knew
about the incest and because she suffered harm at the time of the act, she could have filed suit within
the statutory time limit. See E.W. and D.W. v. DCH, 231 Mont. 481, 754 P.2d. 816, 820 (1988);
DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368, 371 (1987); Raymond v. Ingram, 47
Wash. App. 781, 737 P.2d 314 (1987). The Raymond court, like some other courts, underestimates
the force of plaintiff's defense mechanisms that keep plaintiffs from recognizing the harm caused by
the abuse. Even to trained mental health professionals, incest survivors often appear asymptomatic.
See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
132. 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1988).
133. 242 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
134. Id. at 369-70. The governing one-year limitations period, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 352(a),
began to run in 1980, when the plaintiff reached the age of maturity, and thus expired in March of
1981. The plaintiff filed her complaint nearly five years late, on January 13, 1986. Id.
135. Id. at 369-70. The plaintiff argued that the defense mechanisms she used to protect herself
from the abuse also kept her from realizing the extent and cause of her harm. Id.
136. Id. at 370-73.
137. Id. at 371, 373.
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ply the discovery rule. 138
C. Courts Should Apply the Discovery Rule in Civil Incest Suits
Incest is an intentional tort.1 39  Traditionally, courts are reluctant to
apply the discovery rule to intentional tort cases, reasoning that because
plaintiffs in such cases suffer harm immediately as a matter of law, it is
unnecessary to toll the statute of limitations until the injuries are fully
manifested. 140
A victim of incest suffers harm at the time of the incestuous act. 141
However, unlike most victims of intentional torts, various defense mech-
anisms often keep the incest victim from realizing she has been
harmed.142 Thus, although the victim is harmed at the time of the act,
she is unlikely to fie suit at that time because she is unable to understand
that she has been harmed.1 43
Even if a victim files suit immediately after the incestuous act, or when
she reaches majority, she is unlikely to receive adequate compensation
because many of her injuries are not yet fully manifested. 144 She is not
unlike the plaintiff in Wilson 141 whose asbestos-related injuries mani-
138. Id. at 372. Though recognizing the applicability of the discovery rule when a plaintiff has
repressed memories of the abuse, the court refused to apply the discovery rule to DeRose's case. Id.
The court also dismissed the plaintiff's appeal to recent California legislation on civil incest suits, see
infra note 158 and accompanying text, correctly stating that the new law merely codified the existing
judicial approach. Id. at 373.
139. In tort law, an actor has intent if he desires the consequences that flow from his act or is
substantially certain that those consequences will occur. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A
(1965). Although an incestuous father may not consciously want to harm his daughter, as an adult
he is at least substantially certain that his acts will harm her.
140. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the types of harm an incest
victim suffers.
142. Incest, because it is inflicted within the family context, is especially devastating, and thus
requires strong defense mechanisms on the part of the victim. See supra notes 45-48 and accompa-
nying text. Because most people shudder at the thought of a small child being sexually abused by
her parent, it is perhaps difficult to understand how an incest victim could not know she suffered
harm from the abuse. However, mental health literature strongly supports the idea that many incest
victims are ignorant of the harm. See generally, J. HERMAN, supra note 1; C. COURTOIS, supra note
22.
In some cases, the abuser may tell the victim that the abuse is normal, and because of his position
as an authority figure the victim may believe him. See, eg., Hammer v. Hammer, 142 Wis. 2d 257,
418 N.W.2d 23, 25 (1987).
143. For examples of the time lag between the incestuous acts and the filing of a suit see supra
note 8.
144. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.




fested themselves over a period of several years. Given their general dis-
trust of psychological evidence, 1" courts are unlikely to find that
additional severe symptoms are reasonably certain to occur in the future
and allow damages for them. 47 Thus, a strict application of the statute
of limitations in civil incest suits is likely to leave plaintiffs only partially
compensated for later, and perhaps more serious, emotional problems
resulting from the abuse. 148
Statutes of limitation exist in part to protect defendants from having to
litigate stale claims.1 49 The discovery rule exists to preserve a blame-
lessly ignorant plaintiff's right to compensation. 1 0 The decision whether
to apply the discovery rule involves a balancing of the rights of the de-
fendant against the rights of the plaintiff."' Courts tend not to under-
stand that virtually every victim engages in some defense mechanism to
protect herself from the horror of the abuse. 52 These defense mecha-
nisms may cause the victim to repress memories of the abuse, keep her
from understanding that she has been harmed, or prevent her from un-
derstanding the cause of her harm."5 3 The rights of the victim are the
same, however, regardless of the type of defense mechanism she adopts.
Thus, a judicial approach to the statute of limitations issue based on the
fortuity of whether the victim immediately understands the fact, nature,
and consequences of the abuse is unrealistic and unfair.1 54
The widespread problem of child sexual abuse in our society, the de-
fense mechanisms used by victims, and the substantial harm suffered by
victims tips the balance toward applying the discovery rule in civil incest
tos caused him to develop asbestosis and mesothelioma. The court treated these as two distinct
diseases. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. Incest victims may also suffer distinct inju-
ries that develop at different periods in their lives.
146. The distrust of psychological evidence is apparent in the Tyson opinion. The majority states
that "[p]sychology and psychiatry are imprecise disciplines." Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash.2d 72, 727
P.2d 226, 229 (1986). "Unlike the biological sciences, their methods of investigation are primarily
subjective and most of their findings are not based on physically observable evidence." Id.
147. See supra notes 96-98.
148. See supra notes 43-66.
149. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
153. Id.
154. A victim's use of one type of defense mechanism is fortuitous in the sense that a child does
not consciously choose one defense mechanism over another. The author found no research explain-
ing why a particular child engages in dissociation rather than repression, or projection rather than
acting out.
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suits. Thus, the statute should begin to run only when the incest victim
is aware of all the elements of her cause of action, including the abusive
acts, the harm suffered, and the causal connection between the two.
However, because courts are reluctant to apply the rule in cases in which
the plaintiff did not repress all memories of the abuse, legislatures should
pass legislation specifically designed to give all incest victims a reasonable
opportunity to file suit against their abusers.
V. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Since 1986, several states have enacted specific legislation governing
the time period in which victims of childhood sexual abuse can bring
civil suits against their abusers. Eleven states passed legislation that ex-
tends or tolls the statute of limitations in civil sexual abuse actions. 155
These statutes provide victims of incest an increased opportunity to
reach the merits of their cases.
Most of the new legislation tolls the statute of limitations until the
incest victim discovers, or reasonably should discover, the elements of
her cause of action. 5 6 In 1989, Minnesota passed the longest statute of
limitations for civil incest suits, prescribing a six-year limitations period
from the date of discovery in actions for negligence, and a two-year pe-
riod for intentional tort cases. 157 Connecticut in 1986, Missouri and Ore-
gon in 1989, and California and Colorado in 1990, passed legislation
extending the statute of limitations in civil incest suits. 158 The Connecti-
155. These states are Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Montana, Oregon and Washington.
156. See 1989 Alaska Adv. Legis. Serv. 4; 1990 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1578 (Deering) (amending
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West 1990 Supp.)); 1990 Iowa Legis. Serv. H.F. 2268 (West); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 752-C (1989 Supp.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (West 1990 Supp.);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.16.340 (1989 Supp.).
157. Minnesota allows a plaintiff six years to bring suit after discovering a cause of action for
negligence, and 2 years for intentional torts. MINN STAT. ANN. § 541.073 (West 1990 Supp.).
Iowa's new legislation requires all child sexual abuse claims to be commenced within four years of
discovery of all the elements of the cause of action. 1990 Iowa Legis. Serv. H.F. 2268 (West).
Alaska, California, Maine, Montana and Washington all allow the plaintiff three years after discov-
ery. 1989 Alaska Adv. Legis. Serv. 4; 1990 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1578 (Deering); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 752(c) (1989 Supp.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-216 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.16.340 (1989 Supp.). The Washington legislature was prompted to act by its Supreme
Court's decision in Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226 (1986), refusing to apply the
discovery rule to an incest victim who was not aware of the cause of her injuries at the time filing was
required. See supra note 121.
158. California's statute sets the limitations period at three years from the date of discovery, or
eight years from the date the victim reaches majority, whichever is later. 1990 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv.
1018 [Vol. 68:995
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cut, Missouri, and Oregon statutes do not address the issue of application
of the discovery rule. 59
The new statutory provisions do not share the judicial system's empha-
sis on whether the victim repressed the abuse."6° None of the statutes
distinguish between cases in which the plaintiff remembers the abuse and
those in which she represses memories of the abuse. Furthermore, five of
the statutes contain specific language that allows discovery of the causal
link between the abuse and the injury, the element often at issue in cases
involving plaintiffs who did not repress memories of the abuse. 6 '
State statutes that extend the limitations period arguably give defend-
ants in civil incest suits greater security than those that toll the limita-
tions period until the victim discovers the elements of her cause of
action.162  However, such statutes must provide a significantly longer
limitations period if they are to give incest victims a meaningful opportu-
nity to file timely claims. 163  States considering a fixed-time limitation
1578 (Deering) (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West 1990 Supp.)). Connecticut allows
an incest victim two years to file suit from the date she reaches maturity, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-577 d (West 1989), while Oregon allows five years from the time the victim turns eighteen. OR.
REV. STAT. § 12.117 (1989). Colorado sets the limitations period at six years. CoLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-80-103.7 (West 1990 Supp.). Missouri allows the longest period before barring a suit: ten
years. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 371 (Vernon 1990 Supp.).
159. See supra note 158. The absence of discovery rule language in the Missouri statute may be
less ambiguous. First, the lengthy ten-year limitaitons period indicates an intent to encompass the
same claims as would adoption of a discovery rule. Second, Missouri has expressly adopted the
discovery rule in the area of medical malpractice, suggesting it would have done so for incest cases
had it intended that rule to apply. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.105 (Vernon 1990 Supp.).
160. See supra notes 112-13, 131-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of the emphasis
courts place on this distinction.
161. These five statutes are the California, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, and Washington statutes.
See supra note 157. See supra note 127 for cases in which the causation element was in issue.
Legislation tolling the statute of limitations until the incest victim discovers all the elements of her
cause of action is preferable to statutes extending the time period in which such suits must be
brought. Because of the delay in an incest victim's injuries manifesting themselves and her inability
to understand the connection between those injuries and the abuse, both caused by the use of defense
mechanisms, incest victims need the flexibility afforded by statutes incorporating the discovery rule.
See Comment, Statute of Limitations for Child SexualAbuse Offenses A Time for Reform Utilizing
the Discovery Rule, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 842 (1989) (discovery rule approach is the better
rule in criminal child sexual abuse cases).
162. Statutes of limitation utilizing the discovery rule, however, do not guarantee that all civil
incest suits will be found timely. A plaintiff still has the responsibility to act with reasonableness to
discover the elements of her claim.
163. For example, a five year statutory period would not have benefitted the plaintiffs in Johnson
v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988), or DeRose v. Carswell, 196 Cal. App. 3d 1011, 242
Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987), any more than the existing statutes of limitation did. See supra notes 114-18,
132-38 and accompanying text.
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statute rather than a statute implementing the discovery rule should con-
sider whether the statute meets the dual objectives of providing incest
victims with a meaningful opportunity to fie suit and of providing secur-
ity for potential defendants.
A statute that extends the limitations period until the victim discovers
all of the elements of her cause of action, plus a short time thereafter,
protects both the plaintiff's and the defendant's interests./64 A require-
ment that the plaintiff act reasonably in discovering her claim further
protects the defendant's interests. In assessing whether a plaintiff acted
reasonably, courts should consider the age of the victim when the abuse
began, the frequency and severity of the abuse, the duration of the abuse,
the amount of coercion and force used by the abuser, the defense mecha-
nisms used by the victim, and interventions by third parties on behalf of
the victim. Only if an incest survivor fails to discover the abuse, her
injuries and their cause within a reasonable time period, should the de-
fendant be relieved of defending the suit on its merits.
VI. CONCLUSION
Father-daughter incest is a very serious problem. Often, the victims of
incest suffer serious emotional, physical, sexual and social problems,
which can persist throughout the victim's life. Because the consequences
of incest are so devastating, society has a strong interest in ensuring that
incest victims are compensated for their injuries.
Often, this compensation is not forthcoming because statutes of limita-
tion bar adult survivors' remedies. Through judicial or legislative appli-
cation of the discovery rule, however, women have the opportunity to
prove the harm caused by the acts of their fathers.
Carol W. Napier
164. At least one attorney who represents women in civil incest claims believes that "one year
from the date of discovery is not enough time for many survivors to make the decision to sue." E.
BASS & L. DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL: A GUIDE FOR WOMEN SURVIVORS OF CHILD SEX-
UAL ABUSE 308 (1988). The painful process of discovering and healing makes it very difficult to
think about suing, much less standing up to the demands of the litigation process. Id.
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